The Spread of Islam into India
(Islam in India part one)
10.10.2011
One of the first things I learned from the India institute about Islam, a point emphasized by Dr Sunil Kumar, historian at the University of Delhi, MJ Akbar, a leading Indian journalist and editing director of India Today, and Ashgar Ali Engineer, an internationally known activist against communal violence, is that Islam did not become a part of India as a byproduct of violence. Indeed, all three of these speakers began their talks by pointing out the oft overlooked early history of Islam in India, which came on the boats of peaceful Arab traders settling in Southern India in the early 7th century. The more dramatic (and still politically acrimonious) arrival of Muslim armies in the 11th century is the typical starting point in conventional narratives of Islam in India. Also problematic is the oversimplification of “Islamic rule” often listed alongside with “British rule” of India although the two eras cannot really compare. “Islam” is not a homogenous entity. It is a religion varied by language, cultural norms, sect, and textual interpretations. The Muslim rulers of India were from different cultures, tribes, and clans, and did not represent a single continuous line of rule. They were a varied and diverse group and none of them imposed blanket religious law on their subjects. Also, particularly during the era of the Delhi sultanate (discussed in my first three entries), these rulers fought more with each other than they did with the Hindu masses, a reality which contrasts with the stereotype of a “clash of civilizations” situation with the invading forces of Islam battling the heroic defenders of the Hindu homeland. Real history is always far less simplistic.
(Photos of our visit to the stunning Jama Masjid or “Friday Mosque” in Delhi. Built by Shah Jahan (who also built the Taj Mahal for those of you who didn’t read my last entry), it is the largest congregational mosque in India which can hold up to 25,000 worshippers at one time!)
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(Photos courtesy of Mark Thomas who provided these as I had left behind my memory card that day!)
("Foreign ladies" had to wear these modesty muumuus to gain entrance to the mosque. One of the guys who was handing them out was pretty adorable though. He fancied himself as a stylist and tried to pick the color gown which would best suit the wearer's eyes, complexion, or head scarf. The zeal and enthusiasm with which he transformed what would otherwise be a pretty mundane task, handing out gowns to tourists, was nearly worth the experience of having to wear an additional layer of body-covering of polyester in 105 degree, 90% humidity heat. Nearly.)
(The painfully drawn out experience of kneeling for at least 20 shots on burning hot pavement....)
This emphasis on the arrival of Islam and conversion as a forced product of aggression is found in the earliest European accounts. This “religion of the sword” conversion theory, which historian Richard Eaton calls the oldest and weakest theme of Western historiography of Islam with a “long and weary history dating to the Crusades” is a narrative still advocated today by Hindu nationalists (Eaton, 106). An idea perpetuated most strongly by British colonial histories of India which depicted the 19th century pseudo-scientific (i.e. racist) archetypes of the Turkic-Afghan Muslims from cold mountainous areas which the British belived had produced an extremely virile “race” which could hardly be restrained from their violent excesses, partly because they were faced by the Indian “race,” bred in the tropics and characterized by a lazy, apolitical, and effeminate nature. The British saw themselves as ushering in a new era of India, from the Dark Ages of “Islamic rule” to the enlightenment of British rule. While Hindu nationalists today don’t characterize themselves akin to the British tropes, they certainly do maintain sensationalistic narratives of Muslim aggression and terror. Ali Ashgar Engineer told us that in his experience, communalism and prejudice is stronger among the educated than the rural illiterate, in part due to the pervasiveness of such historical narratives of Muslim conquest which still rankle in the minds of many Hindus. He estimated that the notion of Muslim brute force emerged prominently in the British practice of educating the elite of India to serve the Empire. Here the British emphasized the evil doings of Islam in order to justify their own conquest as a benevolent act which saved India. In doing so, the Hindu upper caste gained consciousness of a double humiliation of conquest and rule by “foreigners.”
Forced conversion, is unsupported by any historical sources and the concept itself is never defined or explained mechanistically by its proponents. Indeed, the earliest Sultan/military commanders actually came from a military-slave class (mamluks), useful to the royals for their familial detachment. Any land they seized would not have to be divided among family members back home. For India, this meant the original Muslim leaders were not nobles- they were considered “uncultured” by the scholarly elite of Dar-al-Islam (the Islamic world) and their focus remained strictly in military conquest and its economic profit. Generally, they proved pretty disinterested in promoting Islamic conversions. Dr Kumar points out that even after the establishment and annexation of the Delhi Sultanate, Muslim immigrants from Persia and Central Asia were an extremely varied and diverse group, who didn’t share the same class, ethnic, or language ties, making it difficult to cohesively define an “Islamic” community of rulers in India. Interestingly, scholars have demonstrated that the biggest flaw in the “sword” theory is found in the geographical distribution of Muslims in medieval India which does not line up with the Muslim power centers. Curiously, Muslims lived the most densely in peripheral areas away from the Islamic ruled cities, suggesting forces at play other than military or political coercion.
A newer theory in the historiography of Islam in India suggested “political patronage” or the conversion of Indians in order to gain perks from the ruling class like tax breaks, promotions, etc. While this happened (likely mostly in the form of acculturation rather than true conversion) it doesn’t explain the mass conversions of peasants in the peripheral regions, especially cultivators who wouldn’t really gain politically from changing religions. The third historical explanation tried to bridge the gap of the “patronage” theory with “social liberation theory,” the notion that Islam’s ideology of social equality offered relief from the oppressive discriminatory practices of the Hindu caste system. (Needless to say, this particular interpretation gained popularity with Indian Muslim scholars!) Eaton amusingly points out that this concept is pretty anachronistic. It assumes that the Dalits (Untouchables) of India’s Middle Ages were sitting around reading and discussing the ideals of universal human equality that their society was lacking. Actually, back to demographics, it turns out the densest regions of Islamic conversion were in far regions of the Punjab and with the indigenous people of Bengal. These were largely people not yet integrated into the Hindu social and literate-Brahmatic system, mostly because these were forested or herding areas on the outskirts of the important agricultural regions. In contrast, conversions were relatively low in the “heartland” regions of Islamic rule and urbanization. So what gives?
Eaton proposes a new theory which he calls “accretion and reform.” In the first stage, stories, deities, and supernatural attributes are “grafted” onto the “existing cosmology” in a syncretic blend which explains the new religion in the cultural and spiritual terms and categories of the indigenous beliefs. In India, this could mean poets referring to the Prophet Mohammad an “avatar” of God, drawing from Hindu cosmology, or calling his daughter Fatima “mother of the world” in order to identify her with the mother goddess worship of India. (Both examples from Eaton’s article referenced below).
(Remember those Hindu images I keep showing from most of the Muslim sites I visited? This one was at the Qutb Minar complex).
Accretion spread Islam gradually into peripheral regions of India from the 14th to the 17th centuries, transforming them into agriculturalists associated with Islamic state rule (made possible by spreading Persian technologies and natural riverine shifts). This also created a very loosely defined and flexible community of people who identified themselves as Muslim based on their worship of Allah, but who were rarely exclusive in their religious practices. Eaton goes so far as to describe Islam for India as a “religion of the plough” rather than the sword.
Only much later, reform movements sought to separate the original cosmology from the doctrines of Islam and gave Allah all of the attributes and agencies of the former pantheon of deities, thus modifying local practice to something that more closely resembled Islam, but as a new variation. (Indian variations would of course prove to be contributions to the overall hugely diverse religion of Islam, with variations in schools of theology and law, cultural applications, language, etc). For example, if a Sufi leader declared a non-Arab, pre-Muslim practice of Indians to be “Islamic” this was accepted as such and folded into the constantly fluxing idea of Indian Islam. The community gradually became a more distinctively defined both internally and externally. The ebb and flow of such concepts of exclusivity and differentness are seen all the way into the 20th century. While the British imperial policies of divide and rule certainly enhanced the tendency of distinctions between Muslims and Hindus, it was also Muslim elites who then pushed for a separate Islamic state in the disastrous Partition of 1947. According to Eaton, this could be viewed as the next stage in a reform process stressing community separateness, which began centuries earlier.
So who exactly spread these new religious ideas into India if not military or political leaders per se? One of the most important agents of both overlapping processes is found in the role of rural village Qadis or judges in creating informal customs of adherence to Islam and who stood as powerful representations of literate Islam, promoting, though not enforcing, sharia law and education in the rural sectors. Also of great importance was Sufism. The Sufis adhered to a particular dimension of Islam which practiced a mystical and completely personal connection to God through the purification of one’s inner self, development of the heart, and drawing nearer to the presence of God through esoteric practices. Generally, scholars account the Sufis as playing a major role in spreading Islam into India and throughout Southeast Asia, largely because of their veneration of saints helped with the "accretion" process in syncretic blending with polytheistic and animistic religions, and that (with exceptions of course) Sufism tended to be less dogmatic than other branches of Islam and more flexibility in its cultural applications, which also aided in conversions. Ali Engineer added to this conception that in his interpretation, the Sufis were not necessarily active missionaries, but holy men who attracted converts through treating the lower castes with dignity (which sounds to me, suspiciously like the “social liberation theory” discussed above) and by making an effort to assimilate into regional cultures through speaking and writing local dialects rather than Arabic or Persian. Dr Kumar also suggested that the Sufi role in India as intentional missionaries of Islam may have been exaggerated, but there is certainly strong evidence for the role of Sufi shrines in influencing local populations as powerful religious centers.
One striking example of religious commonality I observed as a traveler in India was in the similarity of Hindu tree shrines and Sufi shrines. In both, you can cheaply purchase a red thread and tie it to the shrine in symbolism of the wish of your heart. This practice is surely a relevant example of the accretion process, and the Indian-ness of local customs which transformed both Hinduism and Islam.
(Wishes tied to the sacred banyan tree at Jyotisar in Kurukshetra, the spot venerated as the place where Krishna delivered the Bhagavad Gita sermon to Arjuna).
(Wishes tied on a screen inside the tomb of the Sufi Saint Salim Chisti in Agra)
Sources:
Asghar Ali Engineer. “Secularism—Indian Dimensions”. (Unpublished Article), 2011.
Asghar Ali Engineer. “Socio-Political Context” (Chapter 2) in Muslims and India. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing, 2006.
Romila Thapar. Narratives and the Making of History. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Richard M. Eaton. “Approaches to the Study of Conversion in Islam in India” (Chapter 3) in Religious Movements in South Asia 600-1800. Eds. David N. Lorenzen. (2004).
Sunil Kumar. “Politics, the Muslim Community and Hindu-Muslim Relations Reconsidered: North India in the Early Thirteenth Century” in Annales: Economies, Societies, Civilization (2005).
Sunil Kumar. “Courts, capitals and kingship: Delhi and its sultans in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries CE” in Court Cultures in the Muslim World. Eds. Albrecht Fuess and Jan-Peter Hartung. London and New York: Routledge, 2011.
M. J. Akbar. “The Realism of Tomorrow” in Nehru, The Making of India. London: Viking, 1988. 480-506.
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(The famed central pillar of the Hall of Private Audience, the Diwan-i-Khas, where Akbar met leaders of many different faiths. The pillar is meant to symbolize a synthesis of multiple Indian religions.)
(Everyone loves a good pillar.....)
(Elizabeth overlooking the grounds)
(A Hindu image of Krishna, possibly commissioned by one of Akbar's Hindu wives or consorts. Akbar's marriage to one Rajput princess in particular is depicted, probably with great creative license, in the gorgeous epic
img=http://photos.travellerspoint.com/396694/DSC07477.jpg] 
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(Ok, she's so adorable, who wouldn't have taken her photo?!)
(The institute crew resting from the brutal heat with our guide, the aformentioned Gaurav.)
(Taj)
(Humayun's Tomb)
(Sikandra)
(Agra Red Fort)
(Delhi Red Fort)
(David, Meena, and Bryan at the Jama Masjiid of Fatephur Sikri)



(Fatephur Sikri)
(Taj off the beaten path)
(Vladimir at Taj)
(Hum. Tomb)
(Ilyse at Sikandra)
(Robin at Fat Sik)
(In the Sufi shrine at Fat. Sik.)
(Cristin at Taj) 
(One of the Taj front gateways) 


(Hum. Tomb)
(Taj)









(A tiffin for Daylen's kindergarten lunches!)





(Looking across the Red Fort intersection the first day)
(Looking from the opposite direction across the street on the last day)
The strength of my response completely caught me off guard since I’m not much of a softie and also, I had completely mentally prepared for this type of scene. But when a child you just know is probably controlled by a vicious beggar mafia looks into your eyes, you find it is much harder cope with the injustice of global disparity than on paper. Delhi actually has far less beggars now than in decades past due to a city crackdown of beggars, cows, and trash in preparation for the 2010 Commonwealth games the city just hosted. But you are still sure to see them in certain places, or sometimes at traffic lights when you least expect it. I got much better at emotionally disconnecting over time (which is sad in itself) although I did have one other soul-sucking moment when a child of 4 or 5 approached my “tuk-tuk” or auto-rickshaw, holding a skinny baby who reached out and grasped the skirt of my colleague and didn’t let go even as our vehicle started to pull forward. This was a terrible moment. The children ended up moving away safely (for the time being), but that episode stayed with me, casting a shadow over the day. 


(Photo courtesy C. Cash)












